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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Given the large number of prisoner lawsuits filed in the 
federal courts each year, the case at bar raises an 
important question of statutory interpretation regarding the 
mandatory exhaustion requirement governing prisoner 
lawsuits. As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 
1996 (the PLRA), 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a) provides that "[n]o 
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, 
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as 
are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a) (amended 
by Pub. L. 104-134, Title I, S101(a), 110 Stat. 1321-71 
(1996)) (emphasis added). 
 
Douglas Nyhuis, an inmate at the Federal Correctional 
Institution McKean (FCI McKean), brought this Bivens 
action--alleging several violations of his property rights, 
and seeking monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief-- 
without first exhausting the administrative process 
 
                                2 
 
 
available to him at FCI McKean. He argues that he did not 
avail himself of the administrative process because it could 
not provide him with two of the three forms of relief that he 
seeks in the present action--specifically, the monetary and 
declaratory relief. Accordingly, he argues, because pursuit 
of his administrative remedies would have been for the 
most part futile, S 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement 
should not bar his action. 
 
Several of our sister circuits have accepted this argument 
in cases in which exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
truly futile; i.e. the administrative process cannot provide 
the inmate-plaintiff with any form of the relief he seeks. 
The Defendants in this case have suggested in their briefing 
and at oral argument that such a futility exception may be 
appropriate under certain circumstances. Other courts, 
including two courts of appeals, have rejected the notion 
that there is ever a futility exception to S 1997e(a)'s 
mandatory exhaustion requirement. 
 
Subscribing to the minority position among courts of 
appeals, and rejecting arguments advanced by Nyhuis and 
the Defendants, we hold that the PLRA amended S 1997e(a) 
in such a way as to make exhaustion of all administrative 
remedies mandatory--whether or not they provide the 
inmate-plaintiff with the relief he says he desires in his 
federal action. This conclusion is supported by the plain 
language of S 1997e(a), by analogous Supreme Court 
precedent, and by the policy considerations animating the 
principle of administrative exhaustion. Therefore, because 
Nyhuis failed to exhaust the administrative remedies 
available to him, we hold that his action is barred by 
S 1997e(a) and was appropriately dismissed by the District 
Court. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's order.1 
 
I. 
 
Nyhuis alleges that prison officials at FCI McKean 
confiscated several items of his personal property, including 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We express our appreciation to Joseph M. Ramirez, Esquire, who, 
acting pro bono at the request of the court, represented Mr. Nyhuis both 
ably and zealously. 
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a tan bath robe that he purchased in a prison store; several 
pairs of shoes; two electric fans; an assortment of clothes, 
towels, and blankets; a calculator; and a Timex watch. 
These items were confiscated pursuant to the Bureau of 
Prisons' Inmate Personal Property Program Statement (P.S.) 
5580.05 and Institutional Supplement 5580.05, which 
limited the types and amounts of items prisoners could 
have in their personal possession pursuant to P.S. 5580.03. 
Although Nyhuis objected to the confiscation of his 
property, he concedes that he did not pursue the 
administrative processes in place at FCI McKean in order to 
remedy these deprivations. See infra note 12 (describing the 
administrative process). 
 
Instead, Nyhuis filed this pro se action, pursuant to 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971), in the District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. In his complaint, he alleged that the 
Defendants--Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United 
States; Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General of the United 
States; Kathleen M. Hawk, Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons; and John E. Hahn, Warden at FCI McKean-- 
through their control and regulation of federal prisons and 
in their implementation of federal law regarding prisoners' 
living conditions, had violated his constitutional rights by 
depriving him of property without due process of law, 
without just compensation, and in violation of substantive 
due process. He contended, inter alia, that the FCI officials 
at FCI McKean arbitrarily and unreasonably deprived him 
of his personal property, some of which he had purchased 
from the prison store, without giving him a hearing or 
affording him a sufficient post-deprivation remedy. Nyhuis 
also advanced a Fourth Amendment claim, but he has 
abandoned this contention on appeal. In terms of relief, he 
asked for (1) compensatory and punitive damages; (2) an 
injunction ordering both that his property be returned, and 
that P.S. 5580.03 be grandfathered for inmates such as 
himself; and (3) a declaratory judgment, ruling, inter alia, 
that the portion of the Congressional statute that gave rise 
to P.S. 5580.05 is unconstitutional. 
 
Defendants moved under FED. R. CIV . PRO. 12(b)(6) to 
dismiss Nyhuis's complaint. They advanced several 
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arguments, including the contention that, because he had 
failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies 
before filing his action in federal court, his action was 
barred procedurally by 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a). Nyhuis 
contended that since the Bureau of Prisons' administrative 
process could not afford the monetary or declaratory relief 
he requested, exhaustion would essentially be futile, and 
thus, S 1997e(a) should not bar his action. In her Report 
and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge to whom the 
case had been referred accepted the Defendants' procedural 
bar argument and rejected Nyhuis's futility argument. 
 
Rather than merely dismiss the case at that point, so 
that Nyhuis might go back and exhaust his administrative 
remedies, she reached the merits of Nyhuis's action so as to 
dispose of the issues should Nyhuis refile his action after 
exhausting the administrative process. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 
No. 97-324, at 5 (W.D. Pa. July 24, 1998) ("[A]s this court 
only has the power to dismiss this complaint without 
prejudice, only to have it filed again when[Nyhuis] has 
exhausted his administrative remedies, the substantive 
allegations raised in the complaint are reviewed below.") 
(bold in original). Framing the merits question as one of 
standing, see id. at 7-8, and not allowing for discovery or 
the development of a factual record before ruling on 
Nyhuis's claims, the Magistrate Judge opined that Nyhuis 
had failed to demonstrate that he had a cognizable property 
interest in his personal property, see id. at 9. 
 
Nyhuis filed a timely objection to the Magistrate Judge's 
report and recommendation. The District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation as its 
opinion and ordered that the Defendant's motion to dismiss 
be granted. Nyhuis timely appealed. The District Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. To be appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, an order of dismissal must 
ordinarily be with prejudice. See, e.g., Bahtla v. U.S. Capital Corp., 990 
F.2d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 1993). Though the District Court may have 
dismissed Nyhuis's action without prejudice, in this situation, that 
description is anomalous for two reasons. First, the"without prejudice" 
description is in tension with the Magistrate Judge's reaching the merits. 
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II. 
 
Our analysis focuses on whether S 1997e(a), as amended 
by the PLRA, contemplates a futility exception in cases in 
which the applicable administrative process cannot afford 
the inmate-plaintiff with the relief he seeks in his federal 
action, and whether such an exception applies in this case. 
Section 1997e(a) provides that 
 
       [n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison 
       conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 
       Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, 
       or other correctional facility until such administrative 
       remedies as are available are exhausted. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a). As the statutory language makes 
clear, S 1997e(a) applies equally to S 1983 actions and to 
Bivens actions. See, e.g., Lavista v. Beeler, 195 F.3d 254, 
256 (6th Cir. 1999). Bivens actions are by definition 
"brought . . . under . . . Federal law," 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a), 
and Congress clearly intended to sweep Bivens actions into 
the auspices of the S1997e(a) when it enacted the PLRA, see 
Lavista, 195 F.3d at 256 (collecting legislative history); see 
also Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 
1998) (same); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (same). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Had Nyhuis exhausted his remedies and refiled his action, the 
Magistrate Judge (and the District Court by adopting her report and 
recommendation) would have no doubt dismissed Nyhuis's action on the 
merits; her report says as much. Therefore, in a sense, Nyhuis had no 
reason to cure the defect in his complaint. Second, Nyhuis did not 
attempt to cure his complaint by availing himself of the administrative 
process; instead, he filed this appeal, raising the argument that 
exhausting his administrative remedies would be futile. In doing so, he 
effectively stands on his original complaint. Under either of these 
circumstances, appellate review from a dismissal without prejudice is 
appropriate. See Garber v. Lego, 11 F.3d 1197, 1198 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(noting that plaintiff can appeal from a dismissal without prejudice when 
plaintiff cannot cure the defect in his complaint or when plaintiff 
declares his intention to stand on the complaint); see also Bethel v. 
McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1996); Trevino-Barton v. 
Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 919 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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Several courts of appeals have addressed the exhaustion 
and futility question with which we are faced. Two general 
lines of authority have emerged from these cases. In cases 
in which a prison's internal grievance procedure cannot 
provide money damages and the plaintiff asks only for 
money damages arising only out of isolated past harms, a 
number of courts have recognized and applied a futility 
exception to 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement.3 These 
courts, and the district courts that agree with them, reason 
that it is senseless to force a prisoner to engage in the 
"empty formality" of petitioning the prison administrative 
process for a form of relief that it cannot provide. White v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 887 (5th Cir. 1998) (not requiring 
exhaustion before filing Bivens action requesting monetary damages 
when exhaustion would be futile because no monetary administrative 
remedies were available); Lunsford v. Jumao-As, 155 F.3d 1178, 1179 
(9th Cir. 1998) (same); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (same; noting that if Congress created an administrative 
process that could provide monetary relief, the futility exception would 
not apply); see also Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 
1999) (applying Lunsford's futility exception to a S 1983 action). The 
Seventh Circuit can likely be included in this list as well. Judge 
Easterbrook's opinion in Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 182 
F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir. 1999), a S 1983 action, held that "pursuit of 
administrative remedies is necessary no matter what relief the plaintiff 
seeks." He noted, however, 
 
       It is possible to imagine cases in which the harm is done and no 
       further administrative action could supply any  "remedy." Perhaps 
       Lunsford [cited supra] met that description. Suppose the prisoner 
       breaks his leg and claims delay in setting the bone is cruel and 
       unusual punishment. If the injury has healed by the time suit 
       begins, nothing other than damages could be a "remedy," and if the 
       administrative process cannot provide compensation then there is 
       no administrative remedy to exhaust. Perez, unlike Lunsford, 
alleges 
 
       that his medical problems are ongoing and that his treatment 
       remains deficient, so Wisconsin can provide him with some "remedy" 
       whether or not its administrative process offers damages. 
 
Id. (emphasis in original). A subsequent panel for the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals cast doubt on the extent of this exception, calling it 
dicta and not applying it in the case at bar, but did not rule that such 
an exception would not apply in the precise factual context about which 
Judge Easterbrook hypothesized. See Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 
734 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305, 317 (D.N.J. 1998) (Orlofsky, J.) 
("Any other interpretation would compel the conclusion that 
`Congress intended to erect meaningless barriers to suit.' ") 
(citation omitted). 
 
These courts, as do others, see infra note 4, also 
conclude that S 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement, 
which by definition cannot be subject to a futility exception. 
Rather, they hold that S 1997e(a) is a codification within the 
PLRA of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, which before the PLRA was enacted had a futility 
exception grafted upon it. See, e.g., Rumbles, 182 F.3d 
1067-68. Therefore, they conclude, it is appropriate to 
apply the futility exception when it is warranted, much in 
the same way a court would equitably toll a statute of 
limitations.4 
 
Two courts of appeals and several district courts have 
refused to apply a futility exception to S 1997e(a) in light of 
the way the PLRA amended the section. See, e.g., Wyatt v. 
Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 1999); Alexander v. 
Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998); Beeson v. 
Fishkill Correctional Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 896 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). The amendment replaced the requirement 
that plaintiff-inmates exhaust "plain, speedy, and effective 
remedies as are available" with the requirement that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although we disagree that the futility exception survives the 
enactment of the PLRA, see infra Section II.C, we agree with the clear 
majority of courts that S 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement, 
such that failure to comply with the section would deprive federal courts 
of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Massey v. Hellman, 196 F.3d 
727, 732 (7th Cir. 1999); Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 
1999); Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1998); 
Basham v. Uphoff, 1998 WL 847689, No. 98-8013, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 
8, 1998). Section 1997e(c)(2), also enacted as part of the PLRA, provides 
that "[i]n the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious, 
fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary 
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, the court may 
dismiss the underlying claim without first requiring the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies." 42 U.S.C.A. S 1997e(c)(2) (West Supp. 1999) 
(emphasis added). If exhaustion under the PLRA were jurisdictional, this 
section and the power it gives district courts would make no sense. See 
Underwood, 151 F.3d at 295. 
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inmate-plaintiffs exhaust "such administrative remedies as 
are available."5 These courts reason that the elimination of 
the words "plain, speedy, and effective" from S 1997e(a) 
precludes application of a futility exception, and that the 
word "available" refers to any remedy the prison supplies, 
rather than one of the prisoner's choosing. See, e.g., 
Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1326; Beeson, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 
893. 
 
Nyhuis's Bivens action is distinguishable from both lines 
of cases because he requests a mix of remedies, some of 
which were and some which were not available under the 
Bureau of Prisons' administrative process. Nyhuis has 
requested money damages and declaratory relief, which are 
not available from the Bureau of Prisons, see 28 
C.F.R. S 542.12(b) (1999); see also BOP Program Statement 
1330.13, P 6(b)(1)-(3) (1996) (refusing to consider claims for 
monetary relief), and a request for injunctive relief, which is 
available from the Bureau, see 28 C.F.R. S 542.10 (1999). 
Therefore, unlike the cases recognizing the futility 
exception, in which the inmate asked the district court only 
for remedies unavailable to him in the administrative 
process, Nyhuis's action is a mixed claim, in which he asks 
the District Court both for available and unavailable 
remedies. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. To set forth the full text, before it was amended by the PLRA, 
S 1997e(a) provided that 
 
       (1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any action 
       brought pursuant to section 1983 of this title by an adult 
convicted 
 
       of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 
facility, 
       the court shall, if the court believes that such a requirement 
would 
 
       be appropriate and in the interests of justice, continue such case 
       . . . to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective 
       remedies as are available. 
 
       (2) The exhaustion of administrative remedies under paragraph (1) 
       may not be required unless the Attorney General has certified or 
the 
 
       court has determined that such administrative remedies are in 
       substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable standards 
       promulgated under subsection (b) of this section or are otherwise 
       fair and effective. 
 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a) (1994) (amended 1996) (emphasis added). 
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B. 
 
No court of appeals interpreting the PLRA has recognized 
a futility exception to S 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement 
in a mixed claim case. Alexander and Beeson would of 
course require exhaustion in the mixed claim scenario; 
both cases require exhaustion in every case, whether it is 
futile or not. See Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1325 (also noting 
that in cases decided prior to the enactment of the PLRA, 
courts required exhaustion when plaintiff's claims were 
mixed); Beeson, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 896. Those courts of 
appeals that have recognized the futility exception, see 
supra note 3, have not extended the exception to mixed 
claims actions: Two courts have explicitly rejected the 
futility exception's application in mixed claim cases,6 while 
the other courts have impliedly rejected its application in 
similar circumstances.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In Whitley, 158 F.3d at 887, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
applied the futility exception in a case in which the plaintiff asked for 
money damages that were not available under administrative scheme. 
The court noted, however, that it would have required exhaustion had 
the plaintiff in the case not amended his pleading to drop his claim for 
injunctive relief, which he could have obtained in the available 
administrative process. See id. In Lavista v. Beller, the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit wrote: 
 
       Although it may make sense to excuse exhaustion of the 
       prisoner's complaint where the prison system has aflat rule 
       declining jurisdiction over [claims involving only money damages], 
it 
       does not make sense to excuse the failure to exhaust when the 
       prison system will hear the case and attempt to correct legitimate 
       complaints, even though it will not pay damages. Here, because 
       plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as 
monetary 
       damages, he may be successful in having the Bureau of Prisons at 
       least review its policies and procedures concerning disabled 
persons 
 
       at their facilities. If so, presenting his claims to the Bureau of 
       Prisons first would not be futile, even if he cannot receive 
monetary 
       damages. 
 
195 F.3d 254, 257 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation and footnote omitted). 
 
7. See Rumbles, 182 F.3d at 1069 ("Exhaustion of administrative 
remedies under S 1997e(a) is not required if a prisoner's section 1983 
claim seeks only money damages and if the correctional facility's 
administrative grievance process does not allow for such an award.") 
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Such a rule makes particular sense in a case such as the 
one at bar. Nyhuis admits that if we were to award him the 
declaratory relief he seeks, his claims for injunctive relief 
would be "essentially superfluous." Reply Brief at 3. The 
converse, of course, is also true. If, in the available 
administrative process, the Bureau of Prisons were to give 
him the injunctive relief he requests, several of his claims 
for declaratory relief would be rendered moot. Allowing the 
federal courts to fashion prison remedies before the prisons 
themselves have had the opportunity (and have the ability) 
to do so, is surely not what Congress intended when it 
enacted the PLRA. Cf. Perez, 182 F.3d at 536-37 ("No one 
can know [ex ante] whether administrative requests will be 
futile; the only way to find out is to try.""[Otherwise] the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(emphasis added); Lunsford, 155 F.3d at 1179 ("Lunsford . . . seeks only 
damages . . . . He does not request that the Bureau of Prisons be 
required to take further corrective action. . . .[He is] therefore not 
required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit 
. . . in light of the fact that the Administrative Remedy Program only 
provides for injunctive relief.") (emphasis added); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 
F.3d at 1266 (focusing on fact that inmate sought"purely monetary 
damages," which were not available under the current administrative 
process, and not injunctive relief as well). 
 
In cases arising before or outside of the PLRA context, this court has 
treated mixed claim actions similarly. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Carlson, 
739 F.2d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Because a prisoner asserting only a 
claim for damages under Bivens apparently can obtain no relief from the 
Bureau of Prisons, it would serve little purpose to require him to exhaust 
administrative remedies before coming into the courts.") (emphasis 
added). In this line of cases, the futility exception did not apply in 
cases 
in which the petitioner asked both for money damages, which were not 
available in the administrative process, and for injunctive relief, which 
was available. See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 356 n.8 (3d Cir. 
1992) (Bivens action) (citing Veteto v. Miller, 794 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 
1986) (holding "that the requirement for exhaustion of the administrative 
remedy provided by the [administrative process] applies to a prisoner's 
suit for injunctive or mandatory relief whether or not it carries an added 
claim for damages")). As explained below, we believe that the PLRA did 
away with the futility exception altogether. See infra Section I.C. 
Therefore, the PLRA rendered, for the most part, irrelevant the 
distinction that Muhammad and Young drew between mixed claim 
actions and those only involving requests for money damages. 
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simplicity of S 1997e(a) would be lost . . . .") (emphasis in 
original). 
 
Accordingly, under either the across-the-board 
exhaustion approach or the mixed-claim approach adopted 
by courts of appeals recognizing a futility exception to 
S 1997e(a), Nyhuis's action, as pleaded, is barred because of 
his failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies. 
That said, we are of the opinion that S 1997e(a), as 
amended by the PLRA, completely precludes a futility 
exception to its mandatory exhaustion requirement. 
Therefore, we will affirm the District Court's judgment not 
on the ground that the futility exception was not applicable 
in this case, but on the ground that it is not applicable in 
any case. 
 
C. 
 
There are four principal reasons why we are convinced 
that the most sensible reading of S 1997e(a) is that the 
futility exception is not applicable in any case. 
 
1. 
 
The first reason is the plain-reading argument, 
mentioned above, regarding the manner in which Congress 
amended the language in S 1997e(a). As Judge Mukasey 
noted in Beeson, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 893, the PLRA amended 
"S 1997e(a) by, inter alia, deleting the phrase `plain, speedy, 
and effective' and removing all references to Attorney 
General certification or court approval of available 
administrative remedies." See supra note 5 (reproducing 
S 1997e(a) as it read before its amendment by the PLRA). In 
interpreting the alteration in language, we must presume, 
as always, that this amendment was intended to have"real 
and substantial effect." Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 
(1995). 
 
In Alexander, the Eleventh Circuit persuasively described 
the effect of this amendment. The court wrote, "The removal 
of the qualifiers `plain, speedy, and effective' from the 
PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement indicates that 
Congress no longer wanted courts to examine the 
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effectiveness of administrative remedies but rather to focus 
solely on whether an administrative remedy program is 
`available' in the prison involved." Alexander, 159 F.3d at 
1326; accord Perez, 182 F.3d at 537. Concomitantly, Judge 
Mukasey wrote in Beeson, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 893 (citations 
and quotations omitted), the amendment "suggests strongly 
that `Congress now conditions prisoner suits on the 
exhaustion of such administrative remedies as are 
available, without regard to whether those remedies are 
`effective,' without regard to whether they substantially 
comply with `minimum acceptable standards,' and without 
regard to whether they are `just and effective,' " as 
S 1997e(a) had required before it was amended by the 
PLRA, see supra note 5 (reproducing S 1997e(a) prior to its 
amendment by the PLRA). 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, as have other 
courts, attempts to refute this argument, suggesting that 
the retention of the word "available" in S 1997e(a) implies 
that the judicially created futility exception survives the 
passage of the PLRA, which merely codified existing 
exhaustion doctrine. See Whitley, 158 F.3d at 886-87. 
Invoking Webster's definition of the word "available" as it 
applies to a remedy--"a remedy is `available' when it can be 
availed `for the accomplishment of a purpose' or`is 
accessible or may be obtained' "--the court held that if 
prisoner sought a remedy that he could not obtain in 
accessible administrative procedures, pursuant to 
S 1997e(a), he need not avail himself of those futile 
procedures before bringing an action in federal court. Id. at 
887 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 150 (3d ed. 
1981)). 
 
Several courts have exposed the three weaknesses of this 
argument. First, as Judge Mukasey writes, "[R]eading 
S 1997e(a) to apply only where an administrative scheme 
provides adequate relief would "essentially reintroduce[ ] 
the requirement of an `effective administrative remedy' after 
Congress deleted it." Beeson, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 893 
(citation omitted) (alteration in original). Nyhuis and other 
prisoners in similar cases, indeed, do not complain that the 
prisons in which they are confined do not provide internal 
remedies that can be availed "for the accomplishment of a 
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purpose"--as Webster's defines "available"--they merely 
dispute that the internal remedies which are available do 
not allow them to accomplish all of their own purposes. 
This is true even in the non-mixed-claim scenario where 
the prisoner asks for unavailable monetary relief, and the 
prison can possibly ameliorate some of the prisoner's 
concerns with internal remedies. See infra Section II.C.4 
(describing several of these alternative remedies). By 
eliminating the "effective" language in S 1997e(a), Congress 
saved federal courts from inquiring into whether the 
particular administrative remedies available comported with 
inmate-plaintiff's individualized and immediate desires for 
relief. 
 
Second, by leaving the word "available" inS 1997e(a) 
Congress merely meant to convey that if a prison provided 
no internal remedies, exhaustion would not be required. 
The fact that the word survived the changes that the PLRA 
wrought does not necessarily mean that the futility 
exception survives. See Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1326-27 
("Some state penal institutions may not have an 
administrative remedy program to address prison 
conditions, and thus there are no `available' administrative 
remedies to exhaust. Section 1997e(a) permits these 
prisoners to pursue their claims directly in federal court."); 
accord Perez, 182 F.3d at 537; see also Moore v. Smith, 18 
F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (Murphy, J.) ("The 
most natural reading of [S 1997e(a), as it was amended by 
the PLRA,] leads to the conclusion that Congress was not 
asking courts to evaluate the sufficiency of the 
administrative remedies, but merely intended to require 
prisoners to utilize the existing administrative remedies, 
whether the grievance procedure will produce the precise 
remedy that the prisoner seeks or some other remedy."). 
 
Third, by amending S 1997e(a) in the way that it did, 
Congress not only eliminated the futility exception, it 
foreclosed the opportunity for courts to read the exception 
back into the statute. The courts that have attempted to 
resurrect the futility exception and justify their inquiry into 
the efficacy of the available prison administrative process 
ignore Supreme Court precedent cautioning against such a 
move. As Judge Mukasey noted in Beeson, the Supreme 
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Court has drawn a "sharp distinction between statutory 
and judicial exhaustion: `Where Congress specifically 
mandates, exhaustion is required. But where Congress has 
not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion 
governs.' " 28 F. Supp. 2d at 894 (quoting McCarthy v. 
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). Before S 1997e(a) was 
amended, it did not require exhaustion, but rather, vested 
power in the federal courts to make such determinations. 
See supra note 5. Therefore, the "sound discretion" of 
courts governed, McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144, and courts 
were free to recognize a futility exception. 
 
Section 1997e(a), as amended, however, eliminates such 
discretion. It "specifically mandates" that inmate-plaintiffs 
exhaust their available administrative remedies, id., by 
providing that "[n]o action shall be brought" until the 
inmate-plaintiff has done so, 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a). 
Accordingly, as Congress has now "clearly required" 
exhaustion in S 1997e(a), McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144, "it is 
beyond the power of this court--or any other--to excuse 
compliance with the exhaustion requirement, whether on 
the ground of futility, inadequacy or any other basis." 
Beeson, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 894-95 (citing Weinberger v. 
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 766 (1975) (holding that where 
exhaustion is statutorily mandated, "[t]he requirement . . . 
may not be dispensed with merely by a judicial conclusion 
of futility"); Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 
512 (1982) (stating that courts do not have authority "to 
alter the balance struck by Congress in establishing the 
procedural framework for bringing actions underS 1983")). 
 
2. 
 
The second argument in favor of our reading of S 1997e(a) 
has a great deal to do with the nature of prison litigation 
and Congress's intent in enacting the PLRA. As the court 
stated in Alexander, "Congress amended section 1997e(a) 
largely in response to concerns about the heavy volume of 
frivolous prison litigation in the federal courts." 159 F.3d at 
1326 n.11 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. H14078-02, H14105 
(daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995)). The court went on to note, 
"Congress desired `to wrest control of our prisons from the 
lawyers and the inmates and return that control to 
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competent administrators appointed to look out for society's 
interests as well as the legitimate needs of prisoners.' " Id. 
(quoting 141 Cong. Rec. S14408-01, S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 
27, 1995)). Inmate-plaintiffs often file claims which are 
untidy, repetitious, and redolent of legal language. The very 
nature of such complaints necessitates that courts expend 
significant and scarce judicial resources to review and 
refine the nature of the legal claims presented."With these 
considerations in mind, Congress mandated that prisoners 
exhaust administrative remedies and eliminated courts' 
conducting case-by-case inquiries until after a prisoner has 
presented his claims to a particular administrative remedy 
program, which often helps focus and clarify the issues for 
the court." Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1326 n.11. 
 
Exempting claims for monetary relief from the exhaustion 
requirement in S 1997e(a) would frustrate this purpose. It 
would enable prisoners, as they became aware of such an 
exemption, to evade the exhaustion requirement, merely by 
limiting their complaints to requests for money damages. 
See Wyatt, 193 F.3d at 878. The PLRA "is designed to deter 
frivolous lawsuits and this purpose would be undermined if 
prisoners could avoid the law simply by asking for 
monetary damages." Id. Such a result, would "do little to 
`stem the tide of meritless prisoner cases,' as Congress 
intended." Beeson, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 893 (citing 141 Cong. 
Rec. S7525 (May 25, 1995)). 
 
3. 
 
The third argument militating in favor of our position 
arises from the justifiable assumption, that in amending 
S 1997e(a), Congress intended to save courts from spending 
countless hours, educating themselves in every case, as to 
the vagaries of prison administrative processes, state or 
federal. An interpretation of S 1997e(a) that conditioned 
exhaustion on whether an administrative scheme grants 
the relief requested would have the effect of making the 
application of S 1997e(a) dependent upon the peculiarities 
of such processes. Such an interpretation would involve 
federal courts in the tedious and intrusive process of 
evaluating each prisoner's cause of action and the 
underlying administrative scheme in each prison-- 
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something Congress was plainly guarding against when it 
enacted the PLRA. See Wyatt, 193 F.3d at 878-79; see also 
141 Cong. Rec. S7498-01, S7526-27 (May 25, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Kyl) ("Statistics compiled by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts . . . show that 
inmate suits are clogging the courts and draining precious 
judicial resources . . . .  The volume of prisoner litigation 
represents a large burden on the judicial system, which is 
already overburdened by increases in nonprisoner 
litigation . . . . An exhaustion requirement is appropriate for 
prisoners given the burden that their cases place on the 
Federal court system . . . ."). 
 
The statements made at oral argument by the lawyer 
from the Appellate Staff of the Civil Division of the 
Department of Justice in Washington (representing all of 
the Defendants) strengthen our belief that we reach the 
correct result. Counsel advised us that each of the 
institutions in the Bureau of Prisons can and sometimes 
does treat claims for money damages differently. 8 According 
to counsel, in many cases the local Bureau of Prisons 
institution will reject out of hand a prisoner grievance that 
includes a claim for money damages so that the grievance 
would get effectively no review. (This treatment is 
consonant with the Bureau's stated policy. See 28 
C.F.R. S 542.12(b) (1999); see also BOP Program Statement 
1330.13, P 6(b)(1)-(3) (1996).) In such a case, counsel 
suggested, resort to administrative processes would be 
futile. 
 
But not always. Counsel also stated that the Bureau of 
Prisons reserved its right to argue that, had the inmate 
triggered the administrative process and presented a 
meritorious claim, the local institution would have reviewed 
the inmate's claim and fashioned some form of relief other 
than money damages. (We presume that the institutions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. There are ninety four such institutions, see Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, Federal Bureau of Prisons Quick Facts P 1 (Jan. 18, 1999; last 
updated Nov. 30, 1999) http://www.bop.gov/fact0598.html>, housing 
some 136,163 inmates, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Weekly Population 
Report, at *3 (Jan. 18, 1999; last updated Jan. 7, 1999) 
http://www.bop.gov/weekly.html >. 
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sometimes do that.) In other words, the inmate seeking only 
money damages, thinking he has no administrative remedy, 
can proceed to federal court and wait and see whether a 
motion to dismiss is filed, and if it is, he would then know 
that he should have pursued his administrative remedies. 
Of course, by this time, the time limit to file such a 
grievance may have well passed. See infra note 12 
(discussing this possibility). 
 
The Defendants' suggested approach to these cases 
would require prisoners to act as seers, and judges to act 
as detectives as they attempted to discover whether the 
local administrative process could have, would have, or 
might have afforded the inmate relief. The bright-line rule 
that we adopt makes things clear for inmates and insures 
that our time is saved for more important matters, as 
Congress intended. See Perez, 182 F.3d at 536-37. Our 
bright-line rule is that inmate-plaintiffs must exhaust all 
available administrative remedies.9 Under such an 
approach, federal courts need not waste their time 
evaluating whether those remedies provide the federal 
prisoner with the relief he desires. As detailed in the 
margin, this argument has equal, if not greater import, in 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 actions brought by state prisoners against 
state prison officials.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Obviously, for the administrative process to constitute a bar, it must 
be capable of addressing the events that could generate a lawsuit or 
have some relevance to that lawsuit. If, for example, the only grievance 
procedure available dealt exclusively with work assignments, it would 
not have to be exhausted unless the subsequent lawsuit was related 
thereto. But see discussion in Section II.C.4, infra. 
 
10. In Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield, the Supreme Court 
made it clear that " `in the absence of a plain indication to the 
contrary,' " 
Congress should not be understood to " `mak[e] the application of [a] 
federal act dependent on state law.' " 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). Congress gave no indication--let alone a 
"plain indication"--that application of S 1997e(a) should depend on the 
vagaries of state law. In fact, as Judge Mukasey noted in Beeson, 
 
       [T]he deletion of the language making exhaustion dependent on the 
       effectiveness of state remedies, and the removal of the provisions 
       governing assessment of states' remedial schemes by the Attorney 
       General and courts, is a fairly "plain indication" that Congress 
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4. 
 
The last argument supporting our holding relies upon the 
policies underlying exhaustion requirements in general. 
Courts have recognized myriad policy considerations in 
favor of exhaustion requirements. They include (1) avoiding 
premature interruption of the administrative process and 
giving the agency a chance to discover and correct its own 
errors; (2) conserving scarce judicial resources, since the 
complaining party may be successful in vindicating his 
rights in the administrative process and the courts may 
never have to intervene; and (3) improving the efficacy of 
the administrative process. Each of these policies, which 
Congress seems to have had in mind in enacting the PLRA, 
is advanced by the across-the-board, mandatory exhaustion 
requirement in S 1997e(a). 
 
As the courts in Wyatt, 193 F.3d at 878, Alexander, 159 
F.3d at 1327, and Beeson, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 895, noted, a 
comprehensive exhaustion requirement better serves the 
policy of granting an agency the "opportunity to correct its 
own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers 
before it is haled into federal court." McCarthy v. Madigan, 
503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992); see also Perez, 182 F.3d at 537.11 
Moreover, "even if the complaining prisoner seeks only 
money damages, the prisoner may be successful in having 
the [prison] halt the infringing practice" or fashion some 
other remedy, such as returning personal property, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       intended the opposite: to impose one uniform standard requiring 
       prisoners to pursue their claims initially through the 
administrative 
       process, without regard to the nature or extent of the relief 
offered 
       by that process in each state. 
 
Beeson, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 893 (citations omitted). When one considers 
the enormous amount of time federal courts spend reviewing actions 
filed by inmate-plaintiffs, this argument makes a great deal of sense. 
 11. The Supreme Court has recognized that this policy is especially 
important where it implicates agencies of state government. See Preiser 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973) (emphasizing the strength of 
state prisons' and state courts' interests in resolving complaints filed 
by 
 
state prisoners). Therefore, this argument has even more strength in the 
S 1983 context. 
 
                                19 
 
 
reforming personal property policies, firing an abusive 
prison guard, or creating a better screening process for 
hiring such guards. Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1327; see also 
Wyatt, 193 F.3d at 878 ("A purpose of the [PLRA] was to 
insure that prisons have notice of complaints and are given 
the opportunity to respond to prisoner complaints, 
particularly legitimate complaints, so that injuries are 
prevented in the future."). And when a prisoner obtains 
some measure of affirmative relief, he may elect not to 
pursue his claim for damages. In either case, local actors 
are given the chance to address local problems, and at the 
very least, the time frame for the prisoner's damages is 
frozen or the isolated acts of abuse are prevented from 
recurring. See Perez, 182 F.3d at 537-38; Alexander, 159 
F.3d at 1327. 
 
An across-the-board exhaustion requirement also 
promotes judicial efficiency. As Judge Mukasey noted, "A 
prisoner may use the threat of money damages as a 
bargaining chip to obtain relief that he really wants, and 
may then be satisfied when he gets that relief from the 
prison." Beeson, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 895. Moreover, even if 
only a small percentage of cases settle, the federal courts 
are saved the time normally spent hearing such actions and 
multiple appeals thereto. See id. ("Each case settled 
through the administrative process is one less case that 
must be litigated in federal court, with the attendant costs 
--not only to the judicial system, but also to the parties 
and to administrative independence--saved."). 
 
In cases in which inmate-plaintiffs exhaust their 
remedies in the administrative process and continue to 
pursue their claims in federal court, there is still much to 
be gained. The administrative process can serve to create a 
record for subsequent proceedings, it can be used to help 
focus and clarify poorly pled or confusing claims, and it 
forces the prison to justify or explain its internal 
procedures. See Wyatt, 193 F.3d at 878-79; Perez, 182 F.3d 
at 537-38. All of these functions help courts navigate the 
sea of prisoner litigation in a manner that affords a fair 
hearing to all claims. 
 Finally, applying S 1997e(a) without exception promotes 
the efficacy of the administrative process itself, which in 
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our view can be a meaningful and constructive procedure. 
Operating at its best, which it admittedly sometimes does 
not, a prison administrative grievance procedure will afford 
an inmate with the sense of respect. If prison officials treat 
his claims with seriousness and care, they may well 
discover that he can be easily satisfied. For example, in 
Nyhuis's case, returning some of his personal belongings or 
revising the prison policy in question may suffice to 
ameliorate some of his concerns. In other cases, a letter of 
apology, transfer to a more favorable cell block, or 
disciplining the prison official who wronged the inmate may 
suffice. And if the inmate sees his meritorious claims 
handled with care by his jailers, he is more likely to respect 
their rules and serve his time in a manner that is as 
productive as possible. Most importantly, it is to be hoped 
that, under the regime of this case and the PLRA, prison 
grievance procedures will receive enhanced attention and 
improved administration. 
 
It is also important to observe that, if in the long run, 
something of a cooperative ethos can be achieved between 
inmate and jailer, the internal administrative process could 
prove a less hostile and adversarial forum than that of 
federal court. Of course, to serve these purposes, grievance 
procedures must be understandable to the prisoner, 
expeditious, and treated seriously. Although not necessary 
to the holding we reach, as explained in the margin, the 
procedures at issue in this case appear to meet these 
requirements.12 Without embellishing--for the case law in 
 
(Text continued on page 23) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. An inmate "may seek formal review of an issue which relates to any 
aspect of [his] confinement" under 28 C.F.R. S 542.10 (1999). The 
procedure requires that the inmate first address his complaint to the 
institution staff, see id. S 542.14(c)(4), within twenty calendar days 
following the date on which the basis for the complaint occurred, see id. 
S 542.14(a). The staff has twenty calendar days to respond to the 
inmate's complaint. See id. S 542.18. If dissatisfied with the response at 
that level, the inmate has twenty days to appeal his complaint to the 
Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons. See id. S 542.15(a). The 
Regional Director has thirty calendar days to respond. See id. S 542.18. 
Finally, the inmate may appeal his case, within thirty calendar days, to 
the General Counsel in the Central Office of the Bureau of Prisons, 
which is the "final administrative appeal." Id. S 542.15(a). The General 
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Counsel has forty calendar days to respond the inmate's petition. See id. 
S 542.18. All told, the process should take no longer than one hundred 
and eighty days. In fact, counsel for the Defendants has represented that 
"absent an extension of time granted to the prisoner, the grievance 
process in 1999 took no more than an average of 162.05 days to 
complete from the day the grievance arose." 
 
The procedure also insures that inmates are aware of their rights, and 
that their rights are not forfeited unfairly. It provides that inmates may 
obtain assistance from other prisoners, institution staff, or outside 
sources, such as family members or attorneys, infiling their grievances. 
See id. S 542.16(a). It also imposes the duty on wardens that they "shall 
insure that assistance is available for inmates who are illiterate, 
disabled, or who are not functionally literate in English." Id. S 
542.16(b). 
At each stage of the process, if an inmate is late in filing his 
complaint, 
 
these time limits may be extended when the inmate demonstrates a valid 
reason for delay. See id. SS 542.14(b); 542.15(a). 
 
At oral argument, we asked the Justice Department to check with the 
Bureau of Prisoners whether there would be a tolling of the 
administrative statutory period when an inmate filed his federal action 
thinking his administrative remedies were futile, but later the Bureau of 
Prisons asserted a S 1997e(a) exhaustion defense and the District Court 
dismissed the inmate's action on this ground. In a letter memorandum, 
counsel for the Justice Department represented that 28 C.F.R. 
S 542.14(a) requires that "a prisoner file a formal Administrative Remedy 
Request within twenty days of the date on which the basis for relief 
arose. . . ." He further indicated that it was the Bureau of Prisons' 
(apparently informal) policy that 
 
       [w]here a prisoner files an action in federal court within the 
twenty- 
       day period and the court subsequently dismisses that action for 
       failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Bureau of Prisons 
       treats the filing of the action as tolling the limitations period 
for 
       filing the administrative grievance. . . . Where a prisoner neither 
files 
       a grievance with prison officials nor files an action in the 
federal 
 
       district court within twenty days, the Bureau of Prisons views the 
       grievance as time barred should the prisoner's action be dismissed 
       for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
 
This framework makes little sense. To achieve tolling, an inmate must 
file his federal action within twenty days. In our experience, few 
litigants 
could properly prepare a federal action within such a short time frame. 
Moreover, even if the inmate is successful in doing so, the Bureau of 
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the area will have to develop--we note our understanding 
that compliance with the administrative remedy scheme will 
be satisfactory if it is substantial. See, e.g., Miller v. Tanner, 
196 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 1999) (recognizing and 
applying substantial compliance doctrine); Wyatt, 193 F.3d 
at 879-80 (same). 
 
D. 
 
For the reasons detailed in the Section above, we are not 
prepared to read the amended language in S 1997e(a) as 
meaning anything other than what it says--i.e., that no 
action shall be brought in federal court until such 
administrative remedies as are available have been 
exhausted. As Nyhuis admittedly failed to initiate, and 
therefore exhaust, his available administrative remedies 
(rather than those he believed would be effective), we will 
affirm the District Court's order dismissing the action. 
Since the Magistrate Judge, having properly dismissed the 
action for failure to exhaust, should not have reached the 
merits of Nyhuis's claim, that portion of the District Court's 
decision will be vacated. 
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Prisons can always undercut such an effort by asserting the exhaustion 
defense. See supra Section II.C.3. The result: The inmate is back in the 
administrative process. The more sensible rule, and the one we believe 
Congress intended, is that inmates first test and exhaust the 
administrative process, and then, if dissatisfied, take the time necessary 
to file a timely federal action. This rule removes the guesswork and the 
potential for unfairness that inheres in Justice Department's position. 
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